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Intentional Harm – Millison v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co.

| July 7, 2011 | 0 Comments

In New Jersey it is very difficult to get past the exclusive remedy provision.  The leading case on proving an

Heart Case – Hellwig v. J.F. Rast & Co., Inc.

| July 7, 2011 | 0 Comments

In a traumatic heart claim, New Jersey requires a comparison between work and non-work effort. The Central Issue Is:  Does

One Strike You’re Out, Says The Ninth Circuit

| June 28, 2011 | 0 Comments

The Pacific Maritime Association had a “one-strike” rule which screened out any applicant who tested positive for drug or alcohol

Pulmonary/Respiratory – Laffey v. City of Jersey City

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

In one of the most important decisions since the 1979 amendments, the Appellate Division reversed in Laffey v. City of Jersey City,

Permanency Standard of Proof – Perez I, II and III

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

It is an uncanny coincidence that three of the most important post-1980 cases dealing with the quality of proofs for

Occupational Stress – Stroka v. United Airlines

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

When an employee’s worrying is not based on events which actually took place involving the employee but only on what

Occupational Stress – Goyden v. State Judiciary

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

The most important occupational stress psychiatric opinion is Goyden v. State Judiciary, 256 N.J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 128

Liens and Subrogation – Kuhnel v. CNA Ins. Cos.

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

In Kuhnel v. CNA Ins. Cos., 322 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 12, cert. denied,

Liens and Subrogation – Errickson v. Supermarkets General Corp.

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

New Jersey has a powerful subrogation provision under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40.  Respondent is entitled to two thirds of its payment if

Intentional Harm – Laidlow v. Hariton Machinery Co., Inc.

| July 7, 2008 | 0 Comments

Until 2002, the standard employed to decide whether conduct constituted intentional harm was so rigid that it basically amounted to

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